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Ineligibility Under the Emergency
School Aid Act: A Disparate
Impact Standard
Board of Education v. Harris, 100 S. Ct. 363 (1979).
I. INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted the Emergency School Aid Act of 1972
(ESAA)l to give school districts the opportunity to compete for
federal financial assistance in order to reduce minority group isola-
tion and to upgrade the quality of education for all students.
2
Since the federal funds available under the ESAA are limited, it is
the duty of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare
(HEW) to determine school district eligibility and rank applica-
tions according to certain criteria.
3
One applicant for ESAA assistance for the 1977-78 fiscal year
was the City School District of New York City. Although a grant
of $3,559,132 initially was considered, HEW later decided that the
City School District failed to meet the ESAA's requirements for
eligibility.4 Under section 706(d)(1)(B) of the ESAA, an educa-
tional agency is not eligible for aid if, after June 23, 1972, it has:
(B) had in effect any practice, policy, or procedure which results in
the disproportionate demotion or dismissal of instructional or other per-
sonnel from minority groups in conjunction with desegregation or the im-
plementation of any plan or the conduct of any activity described in this
1. Pub. L No. 92-318, §§ 701 to 720, 86 Stat. 354 (1972) (current version at 20
U.S.C. §§ 3191-3207 (Supp. 1 1978)). Statutory references in the text are to
the 1972 Act, as amended, which was governing in Board of Educ. v. Harris,
100 S. Ct. 363 (1979), and was used by the Court in its opinion. See id. at 365
I.
2. 20 U.S.C. § 3192 (a) (Supp. 11 1978). The ESAA is a relatively obscure piece of
legislation which was originally considered "a potential headache" that
would divert attention from more serious concerns. Instead, the ESAA has
become a powerful means of bringing about corrective change in the continu-
ing battle for equal educational opportunity. Holmes, The Role of the U.S. De-
partment of Health, Education and Welfare, 19 How. L... 51, 57 (1975).
3. The criteria for approval are set out at 20 U.S.C. § 3200(d) (Supp. 11978). The
HEW procedure for ranking such criteria appears at 45 C.FR. § 185.14 (1979).
4. Board of Educ. v. Harris, 100 S. Ct. 363, 366 (1979).
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section, or otherwise engaged in discrimination based upon race, color, or
national origin in the hiring, promotion, or assignment of employees of the
agency .. .5
The Board of Education of the City School District (Board) was
denied funding under the ESAA because statistical studies
6 com-
piled by HEW revealed that several schools could be identified by
the racial composition of the teaching staffs as being intended pri-
marily for either black or white students.
7
Rather than contesting the accuracy or sufficiency of the statis-
tical studies, the Board contended that, under the second clause of
section 706(d) (1) (B), HEW must show that any racial disparities
in teacher assignments were the result of "purposeful or inten-
tional discrimination in the constitutional sense."'8 As such, the
Board denied that the disparities were intentional. HEW coun-
tered by asserting that the second clause of section 706(d) (1) (B)
relates back to the first clause, which denies eligibility where con-
duct "results in" even unintentional disparities.9 The district court
upheld HEW's determination of ineligibility and the Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals affirmed.'0 The Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari to consider the important issue of statutory interpretation
and, in Board of Education v. Harris," affirmed the ineligibility of
the City School District for ESAA funds by holding that "impact or
effect governs both prongs of the ineligibility provision of
5. Pub. L No. 92-318, § 706(d) (1) (B), 86 Stat. 354 (1972) (current version at 20
U.S.C. § 3196(c) (1) (B) (Supp. II 1978)) (emphasis supplied).
6. The Supreme Court has adopted a mathematical methodology for determin-
ing when disparities present a prima facie case. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430
U.S. 482,496-97 & n.17 (1977). This methodology has been followed in a school
desegregation case. Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299,
308-09 & n.14 (1977).
7. 100 S. Ct. at 366. See also Pettigrew, A Sociological View of the Post-Bradley
Era, 21 WAYNE L. Rav. 813, 823 (1975). Pettigrew recognizes the need for ra-
cially balanced teaching staffs:
It may be impossible to achieve genuine integration among students
unless the staff furnishes a model. Black students report a greater
sense of involvement when blacks as well as whites are in authority,
and black and white teachers learn the subtleties of integration from
each other when they can work together toward common goals as
equals.
Id. (footnote omitted).
8. Board of Educ. v. Califano, 584 F.2d 576, 585 (2d Cir. 1978), affd sub nom.
Board of Educ. v. Harris, 100 S. Ct. 363 (1979). In Dayton Bd. of Educ. v.
Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977), the Supreme Court confirmed its long-standing
rule that school segregation, or racial imbalance, is unconstitutional only
when produced by racially motivated official action.
9. 100 S. Ct. at 367.
10. Board of Educ. v. Califano, 584 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1978), afid sub nom. Board of
Educ. v. Harris, 100 S. Ct. 363 (1979).
11. 100 S. Ct. 363, 368 (1979).
1128 [Vol. 59:1127
DESEGREGATION
§ 706(d) (1) (B). 'u12 The majority speaking through Justice Black-
mun, based this interpretation on the overall structure of the
ESAA, statutory statements of purpose and policy, legislative his-
tory, and the text of section 706(d) (1) (B) itself. The Court found
that all of these factors indicated a congressional intent to employ
a "disparate impact" standard to discourage racial isolation and
thereby to eliminate defacto as well as de jure segregation in pub-
lic schools. 13 However, Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Powell
and Justice Rehnquist, dissented on the ground that the legislative
history indicated that a school system is ineligible for ESAA funds
only if it has demonstrated discriminatory intent in the hiring, pro-
motion or assignment of teachers.
14
The Court's statutory interpretation in Harris will significantly
affect the eligibility of school districts to receive millions of dollars
in emergency aid. The disparate impact standard, rather than a
discriminatory intent standard, for teacher employment discrimi-
nation will lessen HEW's burden in finding that a school system is
ineligible for ESAA funding. Since the lack of discriminatory in-
tent is not a defense, a school board's desire for extra funds should
motivate it to ensure that a more complete racial balance exists.
The Court's statutory interpretation should stimulate a stronger
spirit of complicity in achieving the social goal of racial equity.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF HARRIS
In New York City, appointments of teachers and principals to
public schools are customarily made by the Chancellor of the Cen-
tral Board. The Chancellor selects high school teachers from a
candidate list prepared by a Board of Examiners. He also has the
power to abrogate unlawful teacher assignments and the power to
12. Id. at 369-70. The Court also held that "a prima facie case of discriminatory
impact may be made by a proper statistical study," such as the one made
here, and that the burden of rebutting the statistical case is on the school
board. Id. at 375.
13. Id. at 370. One interpretation of the de jure-de facto distinction is set forth in
Shannon, Present Direction of Court Decisions Regarding Metropolitan Area
Desegregation, 1 J. L. & EDUC. 587 (1972):
A de jure racially segregated school system is one in which local
or state school authorities deliberately and willfully establish public
school attendance boundaries or regulations to enroll students in
particular schools on strictly or primarily a racial basis; a de facto
racially segregated school system is one in which pupils attend
schools of a predominantly racial sameness simply because they live
in neighborhoods characterized by the racial sameness reflected in
the student enrollment of the local public schools.
Id. at 588 n.2.
14. 100 S. Ct. at 377-79 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (joined by Powell, J., and Rehn-
quist, J.).
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transfer teachers between schools.15 On November 9, 1976, the
HEW Office for Civil Rights sent a letter to the Chancellor stating
that the assignment of teachers, assistant principals and principals
in his district tended to characterize certain schools as intended
for certain racial or ethnic classes. 16 HEW later notified the Board
of Education that it would not grant assistance under the ESAA
since eligibility was not established under the HEW regulations.17
Although the Secretary of HEW has the power to grant a waiver of
the Board's disqualifying practice,18 the Board did not invoke the
ESAA waiver provision.19
HEW's determination of the Board's ineligibility was based
upon statistics compiled by the HEW Office for Civil Rights for the
school year 1975-76 which revealed that while 62.6% of the district's
high school students were minority members, only 8.3% of their
teachers were members of a minority. Moreover, 70% of the mi-
nority high school teachers were sent to teach at schools where
minority student enrollments were over 76%. On the other hand,
the percentage of minority teachers was disproportionately low in
high schools where minority student enrollments fell below 40%.
Similar figures were reported on the junior high and grade school
levels.2
0
The Board did not dispute the accuracy of the HEW statistics.
Rather, it contended that the disparate teacher assignments were
15. 584 F.2d at 581-82.
16. 45 C.F.R. § 185.43(b) (2) (1979) provides that one of the practices which will
disqualify a school board from ESAA funding is an "assignment of full-time
classroom teachers to the schools of such agency in such a manner as to iden-
tify any of such schools as intended for students of a particular race, color, or
national origin." Id.
17. 100 S. Ct. at 585-86.
18. See 20 U.S.C. § 3196(c) (3) (Supp. H 1978).
19. 100 S. Ct. at 366 n.2.
20. Id. at 366-67. The court of appeals opinion listed high schools with high or low
proportions of minority teachers, including.
High Schools With Minority % Minority
Student Enrollments Over 97% Teachers
Harlem 100.0% 70.0%
Lower East Side 100.0 63.2
Boys & Girls 99.9 20.9
Pacific 99.8 37.5
Jane Addams 98.7 34.3
Harlem Prep 98.4 69.2
Ben Franklin 98.3 27.9
Redirection 97.7 47.6
August Martin 97.6 16.7
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the result of certain uncontrollable and unintentional factors,2 ' in-
cluding: (1) state law provisions, (2) provisions from collective-
bargaining agreements, (3) licensing requirements, (4) a consent
decree concerning bilingual education,22 and (5) demographic
changes. 2 3 The district court requested that HEW consider these
justifications, but after an administrative hearing on remand, HEW
notified the Board that the justifications offered either were not
sufficient as a matter of law to rebut the prima facie showing of
discrimination, or were not supported by the facts. The Board ap-
pealed HEW's determination to the district court and the circuit
court of appeals, but both courts agreed with HEW and rejected
the Board's position that both clauses of section 706(d) (1) (B) re-
quire a showing of intentional discrimination before ineligibility
can be established.24 The Second Circuit opinion stated that Con-
gress has the power "to establish a higher standard, more protec-
tive of minority rights than constitutional minimums require."25
The court found that Congress intended section 706(d) (1) (B) to
High Schools With Minority % Minority
Student Enrollments Under 30% Teachers
F. D. Roosevelt 29.4% 1.8%
Lafayette 29.2 0.6
Richmond Hill 28.5 3.4
New Utrecht 22.5 0.0
William Grady 22.2 0.0
Ralph McKee 19.1 3.1
Susan E. Wagner 13.0 2.5
New Dorp 4.3 0.0
Tottenville 3.7 1.9
Board of Educ. v. Califano, 584 F.2d at 583 n.25.
21. 100 S. Ct. at 367.
22. See Aspira of New York, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 65 F.R.D. 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
23. A question that must be asked is whether demographic balance can ever be
achieved in our nation's urban centers. One thoughtful opinion, Calhoun v.
Cook, 332 F. Supp. 804 (N.D. Ga. 1971), provided a bleak answer.
The cause of such frustrating results lies in factors completely be-
yond the control of school authorities. Segregated housing, whether
impelled by school changes or not, remains the unconquerable foe of
the racial ideal of integrated public schools in the cities. The white
flight to the suburbs and private schools continues .... The prob-
lem is no longer how to achieve integration, but how to prevent re-
segregation.
Id. at 806. The problems inherent in demographic shifts provide a good case
for the elimination of the de jure-de facto distinction. Such shifts in the racial
makeup of urban areas are more significant causes of racial imbalance than
were prior state laws and policies which encouraged segregation. See Com-
ment, Conflict Between the Judiciary and the Legislature in School Desegre-
gation, 44 FoRDHAM L. REV. 1206, 1221-22 (1976).
24. See 100 S. Ct. at 367-68.
25. 584 F.2d at 588.
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make any school board that either intentionally discriminates or
unintentionally maintains unjustified disparity in teacher assign-
ments ineligible for ESAA funding.
26
III. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: INTENT OR IMPACT?
Section 706(d) (1) (B) 27 operates, in part, to make a school dis-
trict ineligible for special funding where racial "discrimination" in
teacher assignments is shown.2 8 The issue in Harris can be simply
stated as the question of what did Congress mean by the phrase
"or otherwise engaged in discrimination"?29 In interpreting this
phrase, the Court decided that the whole of section 706(d) (1) (B) is
governed by a disparate impact standard.3 0 In other words, dis-
criminatory intent, in the constitutional sense,31 is not required.
The Court arrived at this decision by use of various methods of
statutory interpretation.
A. Textual Reading
The Court first examined the text of section 706(d) (1) (B) and
found the section ailing from "imprecision of expression and less-
than-careful draftsmanship."32 The majority acknowledged that
the second clause ("or otherwise engages in discrimination")
could be read to imply intentional or purposeful conduct, even
though the first clause ("results in the disproportionate demotion
or dismissal") speaks only of impact or results. 33 However, it con-
cluded that without a clear justification for such a distinction,
there is no reason to divide the statute.
34
The majority's conclusion was pragmatic and supplied a conve-
nient rationale for reaching the desired result. However, the ra-
tionale may have been unnecessarily superficial since it did not
encompass the favorable implications of one tool of statutory con-
26. Id.
27. Emergency School Aid Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 706(d) (1) (B), 86 Stat
354 (1972) (current version at 20 U.S.C. § 3196(c) (1) (B) (Supp. H 1978)). This
section is quoted in the text accompanying note 5 supra.
28. See 100 S. Ct. at 368.
29. Id. at 376 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
30. 100 S. Ct. at 369-70.
31. Unless there is intent by Congress to the contrary, it is presumed that racial
"discrimination" requires more than disparate impact alone; the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment requires proof of purposeful dis-
criminatory conduct. See, e.g., Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406
(1977); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1,
413 U.S. 189 (1973).
32. 100 S. Ct. at 368. The dissenting opinion also characterized the section as
"ambiguous." Id. at 376 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 368-69.
34. Id. at 371.
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struction, the doctrine of ejusdem generis.35 This doctrine of statu-
tory construction states that where "general" legal words follow
"specific" legal words, the general words are construed to include
only items similar to those defined by the foregoing specific
words.36 Ejusdem generis presumes that the legislature has as-
signed a natural meaning to words in a statute.37 Under this doc-
trine, the general word "discrimination" would refer to the specific
words "results in" for its assigned meaning.
The dissent considered, but discounted, the applicability of
ejusdem generis to section 706(d) (1) (B) since the intervening
word "otherwise" can be construed to indicate either similarity38
or, in the reverse, diversity.39 Because of such confusion, both the
majority40 and the dissent41 considered it necessary to look beyond
the words of the statute to arrive at the intended meaning.
B. The District Court Decisions
The Court distinguished the three cases tending to support the
Board's interpretation that a de jure segregated school district
must desegregate to receive ESAA funds although a defacto seg-
regated district need not.4 In Robinson v. Vollert,43 HEW at-
tempted to place a higher standard on receipt of ESAA funds than
that imposed by a court ordering school desegregation. However,
the Vollert court wanted to apply the same discriminatory intent
standard to both ESAA and court-ordered plans.44 In distinguish-
ing Vollert, the Harris Court maintained a position that Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 196445 (upon which court orders such as
those mentioned in Vollert are based) and the ESAA each may
require different standards of eligibility, although each may define
what constitutes proper integration similarly. However, the ESAA
was a legislative attempt to remedy all species of minority isola-
35. See, e.g., Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 18 (1946); United States v.
Stever, 222 U.S. 167, 174 (1911); United States v. Bitty, 208 U.S. 393, 402 (1908);
United States v. Chase, 135 U.S. 255, 260 (1890).
36. See 2A C. SANDs, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.17 (4th ed.
1972).
37. Id.
38. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979), where the
term "otherwise qualified handicapped person" was held to indicate persons
who are similarly qualified in spite of the handicap, rather than persons who
are qualified except as their handicap limits qualification. Id. at 406.
39. The word "otherwise" is defined in BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 1253 (rev. 4th
ed. 1968) as meaning "In a different manner; in another way, or in other
ways."f
40. 100 S. Ct. at 369.
41. Id. at 376 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 374 & n.13.
43. 411 F. Supp. 461 (S.D. Tex. 1976), rev'd, 602 F.2d 87 (5th Cir. 1979).
44. 411 F. Supp. at 472-75.
45. Title VI prohibits discrimination under federally financed programs on the
basis of race, color or national origin. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-4 (1976).
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tion, while Title VI may have been intended to remedy only inten-
tional discrimination.4
In Board of Education v. HEW,4 7 the district court said that dis-
criminatory acts under the ESAA "are those which violate the
Constitution, and discrimination is another way of referring to de
jure segregation." The court provided little analysis for this pro-
nouncement other than a vague reference to the case of Swan v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education.4 9 In Swann, the
Supreme Court spoke generally of a state's constitutional duty not
to discriminate against school children because of race.50
In Bradley v. Milliken,5 ' another federal district court found
that the defendant school board had never been found guilty of de
jure acts of teacher segregation, and then decided that the ESAA
standard of eligibility was not higher than that in Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.52 The court supported its conclusion with
a passing reference to the doctrine of constitutional separation of
powers, and to Vollert. However, the Harris Court stated that it
simply was not persuaded by the decisions in Board of Education
v. HEW and Milliken.53 Apparently, the Court rejected analogies
to the standard used under Title VI as a tool of statutory interpre-
tation for later congressional enactments.
C. Structure and Context of the ESAA
The Supreme Court then examined the composition of the
ESAA generally and found a congressional intent to use financial
incentive as a means to eradicate defacto as well as de jure racial
segregation in schools. 54 In section 7"02 of the ESAA,5 5 Congress
clearly stated its desire to promote the voluntary elimination or
prevention of minority group isolation and to improve the standard
of education for all students. A desire to remove "minority group
isolation" is naturally result-oriented. Had Congress been satis-
fied with the scope of the existing law, which was thought to treat
only dejure segregation,5 6 the ESAA would not have been enacted.
46. 100 S. Ct. at 374 n.13.
47. 396 F. Supp. 203 (S.D. Ohio 1975), a fd in part and rev'd in part on other
grounds, 532 F.2d 1070 (6th Cir. 1976).
48. Id. at 225.
49. 402 U.S. 1 (1971). See note 56 infra.
50. Id. at 13.
51. 432 F. Supp. 885 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
52. Id. at 886-87.
53. 100 S. Ct. at 374.
54. See note 14 supra.
55. Emergency School Aid Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 702, 86 Stat. 354 (cur-
rent version at 20 U.S.C. § 3192 (Supp. II 1978)).
56. For example, the 1971 Senate debates on S. 1557, which became the ESAA,
produced the following statement:
Just the other day the U.S. Supreme Court, in the Charlotte-
1134 [Vol. 59:1127
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Apparently Congress wanted a device to remedy defacto segrega-
tion and thus, it adopted the financial incentive approach.5 7 The
Court reasoned in Harris that "it would make no sense to allow a
grant to a school district that, although not violating the Constitu-
tion, was maintaining a defacto segregated system."
5 8
According to the Court, section 703(a) of the ESAA59 presents,
as federal policy, the idea that guidelines and criteria formed
under the ESAA should be applied uniformly throughout the
United States. These "guidelines and criteria" are to be applied
"without regard to the origin or cause" of any racial segregation in
schools. The Court interpreted this language as looking to impact,
and not to intent.
60
Furthermore, other ineligibility provisions of section 706 oper-
ate to accomplish the goal of defeating both de jure and de facto
Mecklenburg case, made it clear, although they did not define the pa-
rameters, that the reach of the Constitution extends only to the point
where official discrimination-that is, governmental action-has re-
sulted in the separation of the races, and it does not extend beyond
that to situations in which minorities live separately from the major-
ity as a result of factors not related to governmental action.
117 CONG. REC. 11519 (1971) (remarks of Sen. Mondale) (referring to Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971)).
The objective of the Swann case was to remove all vestiges of state-cre-
ated segregation in public schools which were held violative of equal protec-
tion by Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See 402 U.S. at 15. The
Swann Court also told Congress that the school segregation problem was in
the judiciary's arena and that the legislature, even through the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352 §§ 401-410, 78 Stat. 241 (current version at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000c to 2000c-9 (1976)), could not easily encroach upon it. See id. at
16-18.
Shortly after the ESAA was enacted, the Supreme Court handed down
Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973), which held that if intentional
segregation is shown in a substantial number of schools in a school district,
the burden is on the school board to prove that its actions as to other segre-
gated schools in the district were not also caused by a segregative intent. Id.
at 211. Keyes thus "addressed the problem of the obligation to desegregate
school systems that had never been subject to a de jure rule of segregation
that had prevailed in the South and border states before Brown .... " Kur-
land, "Brown v. Board of Education was the Beginning." The School Desegre-
gation Cases in the United States Supreme Cour7 1954-1979, 1979 WASH. U.
L.Q. 309, 358.
57. Recently, alternative incentives for desegregation have been suggested.
These include: (1) allowing voluntary interdistrict transfers of students, so
long as any racial imbalance in the receiving school does not increase; (2)
providing each student with a voucher or entitlement to be used in any ac-
credited school but which has greater worth in an integrated school; and (3)
rewarding students for attendance at an integrated school with post-secon-
dary tuition. See Coleman, New Incentives for Desegregation, 7 HtmLAN
RrGHTS 10, 48-49 (Fall, 1978).
58. 100 S. Ct. at 370 (emphasis by the Court).
59. Emergency School Aid Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 93-318, § 703(a), 86 Stat. 354
(current version at 20 U.S.C. § 3193(a) (Supp. II 1978)).
60. 100 S. Ct. at 370.
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segregation. For instance, a school system is ineligible for ESAA
funds under section 706(d) (1) (A)61 if the school board provides
property or services to a private school institution without first de-
termining that the institution does not practice discrimination.
The Court considered this an "impact" provision, since ineligibility
occurs even where the applicant school board negligently fails to
determine the nature of the private school's practices. 62 Likewise,
section 706(d) (1) (C) 63 disqualifies a school board that separates
minority from non-minority school children by classroom assign-
ments within a particular school for a large part of the school day.
64
The Court characterized this as an "impact" provision as well.
65
This pattern is interrupted by section 706(d) (1) (D), 66 which ad-
dresses conduct that limits student activities (curricular or extra-
curricular) so as to discriminate against minority school children
who would take part in such activities. The Court acknowledged,
67
and HEW conceded,68 that the context of this provision was one of
"intent" and not "impact." The Court dealt with this anomaly by
suggesting that an impact standard, if used in this situation, would
put in question any school board decision not to offer any course or
program, no matter what the purpose or budgetary constraints.
69
Thus, the Court apparently concluded that Congress intended the
ESAA to encourage elimination of defacto segregation by provid-
ing financial incentives.
The dissent in Harris disagreed with the majority's reliance
upon the overall scheme of the ESAA.70 Justice Stewart conceded
that one purpose of Congress was to eradicate minority isolation
no matter what the cause. But the Court also should have consid-
ered other purposes of the ESAA, such as that found in section
708(c),71 which provided earmarked funds for minority school chil-
dren who live in areas where the predominant language is not Eng-
lish.7 2 Apparently, Justice Stewart did not believe that the
majority's disparate impact standard should blanket section
61. Emergency School Aid Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 706(d) (1) (A), 86 Stat.
354 (current version at 20 U.S.C. § 3196(c)(1) (A) (Supp. II 1978)).
62. 100 S. Ct. at 370.
63. Emergency School Aid Act of 1972, Pub. I No. 92-318, § 706(d) (1) (c), 86 Stat.
354 (current version at 20 U.S.C. § 3196(c) (1) (C) (Supp. 111978)).
64. An exception is provided only for good faith ability grouping. Id.
65. 100 S. Ct. at 370.
66. Emergency School Aid Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 706(d) (1) (D), 86 Stat.
354 (current version at 20 U.S.C. § 3196(c)(1)(D) (Supp. 111978)).
67. 100 S. Ct. at 370 n.5.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 377 n.3 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
71. Emergency School Aid Act of 1972, Pub. L No. 92-318, § 708(c), 86 Stat. 354
(1972) (repealed 1979). But see 20 U.S.C. § 3261 (Supp. 11 1978).
72. 100 S. Ct. at 377. See also S. REP. No. 92-61, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 22-24 (1971).
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706(d) (1) (B) and all other sections of the ESAA absent a clear sin-
gle objective. It should be noted that the majority opinion did rec-
ognize anomalies in the ESAA's thrust.7 3 However, it also
maintained that there could be no disagreement respecting the
"underlying philosophy of the Act."74
D. Legislative History
The majority opinion also used the legislative history of the
ESAA to support its view that the disparate impact standard gov-
erns teacher assignments in section 706(d) (1) (B). The report by
the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 75 which dealt
with one of the proposed ESAA bills, the Emergency School Aid
and Quality Integrated Education Act of 1971,76 was considered
first. One passage of the report, quoted by the Court, stated that
the clause which later became section 706(d) (1) (B) would make a
school board ineligible if it discriminated in its employment con-
duct. The report also stated that the clause "presumes one prac-
tice to be discriminatory: the disproportionate demotion or
dismissal of instructional or other personnel from minority groups
in conjunction with desegregating its schools or establishing inte-
grated schools. ' 77 In its argument, the Board emphasized the re-
port term "presumes one practice" as showing intent to make a
clear distinction between language in section 706(d) (1) (B) refer-
ring to "demotion or dismissal" and that referring to "hiring, pro-
motion or assignment. ' 78 Although the Court was persuaded that
some distinction between the two clauses of section 706(d) (1) (B)
was intended, the distinction it found was consistent with the over-
all impact scheme. 79 The Court found a strict irrebuttable impact
test in the first clause which prohibits conduct resulting in dispro-
portionate demotion or dismissal of teachers. Under this test, a
school board would be ineligible for funds under the ESAA if its
faculty was racially disproportionate due to demotions or termina-
tions in employment. There would be no need to prove intent and
the school board would not have an opportunity to justify the dis-
parity. In the second clause, which prohibits racial discrimination
in the hiring, promotion or assignment of teachers, the Court found
a rebuttable impact test. This test would make a school board inel-
igible for funds if faculty disparity occurs because of hiring, promo-
73. See notes 66-69 & accompanying text supra.
74. 100 S. Ct. at 370.
75. S. REP. No. 92-61, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
76. S. 1557, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
77. S. REP. No. 92-61, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1971), quoted in Board of Educ. v.
Harris, 100 S. Ct. 363, 371 (1979).
78. Brief for Petitioners at 26, Board of Educ. v. Harris, 100 S. Ct. 363 (1979); 100 S.
Ct. at 377.
79. 100 S. Ct. at 371.
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tion or assignment in employment. Again, there would be no need
to prove intent, but the school board could attempt to justify the
disparity.
For its irrebuttable-rebuttable impact distinction, the Court re-
lied on another passage of the Senate committee report which indi-
cated that disproportionate demotion or dismissal of teachers
would constitute a per se violation when the disparity arises with
desegregation activity.80 From this per se qualification of the first
clause of section 706(d) (1) (B), the majority deduced that the sec-
ond clause, for which there was no per se qualification, is governed
by an impact test wherein the school board has an opportunity to
rebut any disparity in assignments.
8 1
The dissent felt that the majority was inconsistent in its subtle
distinction between the two clauses. 82 It recognized a conflict be-
tween the irrebuttable-rebuttable distinction and the prior reason-
ing that "[u] nless a solid reason for a distinction exists"' 83 between
closely related statutory phrases, none should be implied. How-
ever, the Court's prior reasoning is still consistent since the Senate
committee report provided a valid reason for an irrebuttable-rebut-
table distinction, but none for an impact-intent distinction.
The dissent also found language in the Senate committee re-
port which stated that the first clause "is not modified or in any
way diminished"84 by the second clause.85 On the basis of this ad-
mitted distinction, along with some historical statistics, the dissent
concluded that the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare in-
tended the first clause to be more burdensome to the applicant
than the second clause.8 6 Yet, the majority did recognize that in-
tent by making its limited distinction: an irrebuttable impact test
is more burdensome to the applicant than a rebuttable impact test.
The majority found a second major item in the legislative his-
tory to support its "impact" interpretation in the Senate debates
on the Stennis Amendment to the proposed Emergency School
Aid and Quality Integrated Education Act of 1971 (ESAQIEA).87
Since the ESAA of 1972 was essentially the same act as the pro-
posed ESAQIEA, the legislative history is pertinent. In addition,
80. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 92-61, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 18-19 (1971)).
81. 100 S. Ct. at 371. However, the Court did not express an opinion on whether
the Board had produced sufficient evidence to rebut the disparities in teacher
assignments since the Board had not brought the matter into issue. Id. at
375.
82. 100 S. Ct. at 378 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 371.
84. Id. at 377 (quoting S. REP. No. 92-61, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1971)) (emphasis
omitted).
85. 100 S. Ct. at 377.
86. Id. at 377-78.
87. S. 1557, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
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the Stennis Amendment eventually became the federal policy pro-
nouncement of section 703(a) of the ESAA, which requires uni-
form standards of enforcement nationwide.88 Those senators in
favor of uniform application of the ESAQIEA argued that the Sten-
nis Amendment would help eliminate the constitutional double
standard whereby integration policies were strictly applied in the
southern states (where de jure segregation was once prevalent),
but leniently applied in the northern states (where any segrega-
tion was traditionally defacto).89 Although there was no apparent
reason for concern, opponents of the Stennis Amendment worried
-that uniform application of the ESAQIEA "could be construed as
an endorsement of weakened enforcement throughout this Na-
tion."90 The amendment was included in the ESAA when it was
enacted in 1972. Thus, the legislative history9l of the uniform ap-
plication pronouncement of section 703(a) gave the Harris Court
another suggestion that the ineligibility rules of section 706 "focus
on actualities, not on history, on consequences, not on intent."
92
The dissenting justices were reluctant to accept the Court's
reading of the Stennis Amendment.93 Since the amendment ap-
plies not just to the ESAA, but also to Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,94 it may have been construed to incorporate a discrimi-
natory intent standard rather than a disparate impact standard.95
88. See notes 59-60 & accompanying text supra.
89. One senator vividly described the essence of the perceived double standard:
I have never been able to understand how a 10-year-old colored
student in a public school in Harlem, Watts, or South Chicago, is ex-
pected to look around and see nothing but black faces in his class-
room and say to himself: 'This kind of racial separation does not
hurt me because the State of Illinois does not-have a law requiring
me to attend all-black schools. I should not feel hurt by this racial
separation because it is the result of housing patterns that just acci-
dentally developed."
117 CONG. REC. 11512 (1971) (remarks of Sen. Eastland), quoted in Board of
Educ. v. Harris, 100 S. Ct. 363, 372 n.7 (1979). See also 117 CONG. REc. 11508-10
(1971) (remarks of Sen. Stennis).
90. 117 CONG. REC. 11518 (1971) (remarks of Sen. Mondale), quoted in Board of
Educ. v. Harris, 100 S. Ct. 363, 372 n.8 (1979). See also 117 CONG. REC. 11516-17
(1971) (remarks of Sen. Javits).
91. In final debate, the Stennis Amendment was summarized as follows: "[W]e
will have a uniform national policy in school desegregation matters, North,
South, East, and West applied uniformly without regard to the origin or cause
of such segregation. That is the Stennis amendment, pure and simple." 118
CONG. REC. 18844 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Stennis), quoted in Board of Educ.
v. Harris, 100 S. Ct. 363, 372 n.9 (1979).
92. 100 S. Ct. at 373.
93. Id. at 379 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
94. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-4 (1976). Title VI prohibits discrimination under
federally financed programs on the ground of race, color or national origin.
95. See University of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), where five jus-
tices concluded that Title VI prohibits only purposeful discrimination in
federally financed programs, that is, discrimination in violation bf the fifth
amendment and the fourteenth amendment equal protection clause. Id. at
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Does that mean the uniform national standard would be a discrim-
inatory intent standard? For the majority, Justice Blackmun an-
swered that it is not incongruous to find the Stennis Amendment
defining ESAA discrimination as meaning disparate impact when
Title VI might incorporate a discriminatory intent definition, since
section 703(a) refers to ESAA, while section 703(b) refers to Title
VI.9 6 The majority felt it did not have to address the issue of
whether Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 embraces the con-
stitutional standard97 since there was no indication that Title VI
and the ESAA were meant to be coextensive. 98
The ineligibility provisions of section 706 may well impose a
stricter standard on the school board than Title VI would. Under
Title VI, all federal funds to a public school would be terminated
for civil rights violations. Congress probably does not wish to im-
pose a strict impact standard on Title VI provisions since it could
easily result in the loss of federal funds for essential programs in
many schools, and hence for many innocent school children. On
the other hand, only ESAA funds would be unavailable when an
ESAA impact violation is determined. Since ESAA funds operate
as incentives to eradicate defacto segregation, and since there ex-
ists fierce competition for the funds, their unavailability to a school
district where segregated teaching staffs are maintained appears
justifiable.99
Finally, the majority found it significant that Congress was
aware of an existing HEW regulation 1° when the ESAA was reen-
acted in 1978.101 Section 185.43(b) (2) provides in part that a school
is ineligible for ESAA assistance if it effectuates any "practice, pol-
287 (Powell, J.); id. at 328 (Brennan, J., joined by White, Marshall, and Black-
mun, JJ.). See also note 31 supra.
96. 100 S. Ct. at 372 n.10.
97. See note 31 supra.
98. 100 S. Ct. at 374.
99. Id.
100. 45 C.F.R. § 185A3(b) (2) (1979) provides, in part, that:
No educational agency shall be eligible for assistance under the
Act if, after June 23, 1972, it has had or maintained in effect any other
practice, policy, or procedure which results in discrimination on the
basis of race, color, or national origin in the recruiting, hiring, promo-
tion, payment, demotion, dismissal, or assignment of any of its em-
ployees . . . , including the assignment of full-time classroom
teachers to the schools of such agency in such a manner as to iden-
tify any of such schools as intended for students of a particular race,
color, or national origin.
Section 185.43(b) (2) only prohibits teacher assignments that racially identify
schools-it does not require faculties to be perfectly balanced. 100 S. Ct. at
373. Indeed, the ESAA's sponsor in the House stated that perfect racial bal-
ance was not required for aid under the Act. See 117 CONG. REC. 39332 (1971)
(remarks of Reps. Pucinski and Esch), quoted in Board of Educ. v. Harris, 100
S. Ct. at 373.
101. 100 S. Ct. at 365 n.1.
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icy, or procedure which results in discrimination on the basis of
race, color, or national origin in the recruiting, hiring, promotion,
payment, demotion, dismissal, or assignment of any of its employ-
ees. o1 0 2 Section 185.43 (b) (2) further prohibits only teacher assign-
ments which identify schools racially-it does not require faculties
to be perfectly balanced.103 The regulation's narrower second re-
quirement might be seen as limiting HEW's capacity to completely
eliminate de facto segregation, but the Court found no indication
that Congress intended to weaken the eligibility provisions. 0 4 In
1978, the House included a special waiver-of-ineligibility provision
to address complaints about the regulation's applicability to situa-
tions in Los Angeles and New York City.105 However, the provi-
sion was deleted in the report of the conference committee. 106 The
Court also noted that the President of the American Federation of
Teachers urged the Senate to reform the ESAA "to require a find-
ing of discrimination, not simply a numerical imbalance, before
ESAA funds can be cut off."' 0 7 No reformation was made, how-
ever, which implies that Congress agreed with HEW's interpreta-
tion of the statute. 0 8
IV. CONCLUSION
Over a quarter century after Brown v. Board of Education,0 9
racial isolation still remains a problem in New York public schools,
just as it remains a problem in other major urban areas.11 0 Within
that time, the Supreme Court has shown its desire to reallocate
teachers in each segregated school district so that each school's
staff approximates the composition of the entire district."' Cer-
tainly policy considerations outside the constitutional realm favor
this result. Fair racial representation on school faculties demon-
102. 45 C.F.R. 185.43(b) (2) (1979).
103. Id.
104. 100 S. Ct. at 373.
105. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 95-1137, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 95-96 (1978), reprinted in
[19781 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4971, 5065-66).
106. Id. at 374 (citing H.RL CoNF. REP. No. 95-1753, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 286, re-
printed in [19781 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4971, 5189).
107. See Education Amendments of 1977" Hearings on S. 1753 Before the Subcomm.
on Educ., Arts and Humanities of the Senate Comm. on Human Resources,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1275 (1977).
108. 100 S. Ct. at 374. See, e.g., Andrus v. Allard, 100 S. Ct. 318, 322-23 (1979); NLRB
v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 275 (1974).
109. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). In Brown, the Supreme Court found the use of race as a
classification unconstitutional for assignment of students to public schools
which they were required to attend.
110. See Holmes, The Role of the U.S. Department of Healtk, Education and Wel-
fare, 19 How. L.J. 51, 60 (1975).
111. See Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 402 U.S. 33, 35 (1971); Swann v. Char-
lotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1,19-20 (1971); United States v. Mont-
gomery County Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225, 232-36 (1969).
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strates that the school system and the community believe that ra-
cial equity is an important priority. Also, an integrated faculty
affords the opportunity to present to students and the community
a role model of harmony, friendship and trust between the
races. 112 Furthermore, a broader educational experience for all
students might result from the greater diversity in cultural, politi-
cal and economic backgrounds to which they are exposed.
In Harris, the Supreme Court primarily relied upon legislative
history to find congressional intent to pair section 706(d) (1) (B) of
the ESAA with a disparate impact standard. From a legal process
standpoint, reliance on legislative history is illusory at best.
113
What chance is there that the several hundred members of Con-
gress have identical situations in mind as being covered or not by
the statutory language for which they vote? It is highly improbable
that the members of Congress even consider all relevant contin-
gencies when they cast their votes. More importantly, Congress
does not enact committee reports and floor debates into law-it
only enacts statutes.
Yet, it remains the duty of the Court to find legislative intent
when a well-meaning act of Congress suffers from "less-than-care-
ful draftsmanship."'114 When faced with an ambiguous statute, the
Court must clarify its meaning and thereby find the law. To find
the law, the Court must make an honest use of the available tools
of statutory construction. In Harris, the Court did that much, but
it is also encouraging to note that the decision in all probability
reflects the personal values of a majority of the Court.
Although the issue of statutory construction is narrow, the Har-
ris Court's favorable response to such a vulnerable question is cer-
tainly welcome news to those who follow legal developments in
civil rights. The decision indicates the viewpoint of a majority of
the Court, a viewpoint which may be expressed again in later in-
terpretations of the ESAA or Title VI. The Court shows some sen-
sitivity to advancing the goal of breaking down the walls between
the traditionally advantaged and the traditionally deprived. Harris
suggests that desegregation within public schools remains one of
the primary goals available for the long term advancement of hu-
manity.
Michael T. Brogan '81
112. Chesler, Crowfoot & Bryant, Institutional Changes to Support School Desegre-
gation: Alternative Models Underlying Research and Implementation, 42
LAW & CoNrMP. PROB. 174, 196 (Autumn 1978).
113. See, e.g., Witherspoon, Administrative Discretion to Determine Statutory
Meaning: "The High Road," 35 TEx. L. REV. 63, 74 (1956).
114. 100 S. Ct. at 368.
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